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Abstract 
 
This article draws on secondary historical sources and primary interviews to highlight 
how the legacy of local government’s creation in England and Germany has 
significant implications for policy-making in the present day. By employing an 
institutionalist perspective to analyse how one municipality in each country tries to 
promote renewable energy and retrofit private housing, it demonstrates how historical 
factors have resulted in the German council having more capacity to act hierarchically 
in local governance arrangements than its English counterpart. These findings have 
notable implications for how governments at all levels seek to tackle major challenges 
such as climate change. 
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Cities and climate change: how historical legacies shape policy-
making in English and German municipalities  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Geographers such as Harriet Bulkeley (2005) have emphasised that cities need to play 
a key role in combating climate change for many years, and have also stressed how 
municipal capacity plays a key role in determining governance approaches (Bulkeley 
and Kern 2006). However, political scientists have only recently begun to analyse 
how and why subnational actors are tackling this crucial issue (Krause 2013; Heinelt 
and Lamping 2015; Hughes 2016). Furthermore, these studies have not compared 
municipalities in different countries, which means that we do not know a great deal 
about how contrasting local government systems may influence climate policy-
making arrangements. At the same time, comparisons of subnational systems have not 
drawn explicit links between the reasons why nation-states created modern-day 
municipalities in the first place and contemporary governance arrangements at the 
local level. In other words, how have historical legacies shaped the nature of 
contemporary multi-level systems, and what impact do they have on local climate 
policy-making? 
 
Drawing on both secondary historical analyses and primary fieldwork interviews in 
two medium-sized cities (Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle upon Tyne), this article will 
address these questions in the German and English contexts. By focusing on two 
strands of policy that relate to both municipalities’ climate change strategies (namely 
renewable energy and improving the thermal efficiency of privately-rented housing), 
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it shows how Gelsenkirchen Council has more capacity to act as a genuine local 
authority and rely on hierarchical implementation techniques compared to its 
counterpart in Newcastle. This is because German municipalities were established as 
civic institutions that had significant autonomy to stimulate economic development 
and foster local pride, whereas the British Government1 created councils primarily for 
reasons of politically expediency – namely to deal with the negative side-effects of 
the industrial revolution. Such contrasting governance approaches have significant 
implications for local democracy and policy outcomes, because they result in a 
different balance of power between state and non-state actors. 
 
The article uses historical institutionalism as a theoretical lens to make the link 
between local government’s creation and contemporary subnational arrangements in 
the two cities. Following the methods section, it will examine historical institutionalist 
perspectives and their implications for path-dependency in decision-making, before 
outlining how modern local government has evolved in both countries since the early 
nineteenth century. The article then incorporates these historical legacies into an 
analysis of how Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle Councils have sought to reduce their 
cities’ reliance on fossil fuels and improve the thermal efficiency of privately-rented 
housing. This leads into a discussion about the nature of policy-making in the two 
cities, before the arguments are summed up in the conclusion. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Until devolution at the end of the twentieth century, the British government was responsible for local 
authorities in England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland (Northern Ireland after partition in 1918). Since 
1999 it has only overseen councils in England, the country that this article uses for comparative 
purposes.   
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2. Methods 
 
The historical analysis of local government’s creation relies on a synthesis of existing 
secondary literature, whilst the examination of contemporary governance 
arrangements is based on a total of 34 fieldwork interviews with 37 people in the 
‘twin towns’ of Newcastle upon Tyne and Gelsenkirchen, as well as municipal policy 
documentation in both cities. I conducted the Newcastle interviews between early 
2012 and autumn 2015, and carried out the Gelsenkirchen fieldwork in summer 2013. 
The interviewees were predominantly senior council managers (from the 
environment, planning, economic development, corporate procurement and policy 
departments), although they also included staff in a number of other public bodies and 
representatives from the local voluntary sector in each city. Fifteen of the discussions, 
which covered 19 individuals, were in Gelsenkirchen and the surrounding area, and 
the remaining 19 interviews involved 18 different people in Newcastle. I analysed the 
interview data to identify policy-making processes in each city, including their 
approaches to promoting renewable energy and improving the thermal efficiency of 
privately-rented housing. Both councils prioritised these issues in their climate 
protection strategies, and therefore they represent particularly useful cases for 
comparison. 
 
The cities have similar populations (around 270,000), a shared heritage of heavy 
industry (particularly coal mining), and both have experienced significant economic 
decline in recent decades. In addition, they have sought to address this decline by re-
branding themselves as forward-thinking, sustainable locations in order to attract 
investment and stimulate economic development (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Jung, 
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Hardes, and Schröder, 2010). The municipalities are both involved in the Covenant of 
Mayors initiative and have agreed policy strategies that incorporate explicit political 
objectives on mitigation and adaptation (Stadt Gelsenkirchen, 2011; Newcastle City 
Council, 2010), including targets to reduce the level of carbon dioxide emitted from 
each city by over 20% between 2005 and 2020. In other words, they share similar 
challenges and objectives on climate change policy. Crucially, however, the legacy of 
local government’s creation in both countries has resulted in them adopting very 
different strategies to achieve them. 
 
3. Overview of historical institutionalist perspectives 
 
After Philip Selznick published his seminal book on the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(Selznick, 1949), various sub-branches of (neo-)institutionalism developed within 
political science. Notably, Hall and Taylor (1996) identified three distinct streams, 
which they termed historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism. The 
historical branch stresses the importance of ‘path-dependency’ to political phenomena 
and demonstrates how institutions and actors are shaped by previous experience – 
their ‘historical contingency’, which ‘locks-in’ and restricts the options available to 
decision-makers (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006). This institutional legacy results in 
‘sticky’ policies that linger for a long time after they have solved a perceived problem 
(March and Olsen, 1989; Thoenig, 2003), often because dominant actors benefit from 
existing arrangements and therefore seek to prolong the status quo (Pierson, 2000). By 
defining ‘institution’ in very broad terms, this perspective considers the influence of 
social constructs – such as the traditions, habits, rules and conventions that apply to 
social interactions (Ostrom, 1986) – as well as large-scale phenomena or 
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organisations. Crucially, institutions are difficult to remove (even once they have 
outlived their purpose), which means that the legacy of previous behaviour is likely to 
endure. 
 
Indeed, the implication that institutions remain stable over long periods of time led 
some scholars to question how the theory can explain changes in policy (Peters, 
Pierre, and King, 2005). Historical institutionalism appeared to suggest that shifts are 
either slow, incremental and occur within the constrained context of the existing 
institutional framework – or they are precipitated by a ‘radical shock’ (March and 
Olsen, 1989) at a ‘critical juncture’ (Collier and Collier, 1991) that ‘punctuates the 
equilibrium’ (True, Jones, and Baumgartner, 1999) and leads to the creation of a new 
set of arrangements. This dichotomous explanation is perhaps too simplistic (Gorges, 
2001; Greener, 2005), which led other scholars to suggest more nuanced explanations 
for gradual – but nonetheless transformative – institutional change (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005; van der Heijden, 2011).  
 
However, despite the difficulties associated with trying to explain change, there is 
widespread agreement that ‘institutions matter’ and help to structure socio-political 
outcomes (Gandhi and Ruiz-Rufino, 2015). In line with this approach, this article 
argues that English municipalities have essentially remained politically-expedient 
agents of central government, delivering less ‘glamorous’ services on behalf of 
ministers, ever since their creation in 1835. In contrast, their Prussian counterparts 
were established in 1808 as civic bodies, a principle that remained dominant until the 
‘radical shock’ of the Great Depression, but was re-established in post-war West 
Germany and has remained prevalent ever since. Crucially, these legacies have had a 
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significant impact on local policy-making arrangements in both countries, which 
continues in the present day.  
 
4. Multi-level governance in England and Germany  
 
In recent decades, various scholars have developed typologies for classifying local 
government systems in developed countries (Goldsmith and Page, 1987; Hesse and 
Sharpe, 1991; Batley and Stoker, 1991; Bennett, 1993; Norton, 1994; Pierre, 1999; 
John, 2001). These categories are based on indicators such as the legal or 
constitutional status of local authorities, their average size, and their autonomy from 
central or state governments. Notably, none of them have placed Germany and the 
UK/England in the same category, which illustrates how much the subnational 
governance systems in the two countries differ. Similarly, Herrschel and Newman 
(2002) adopted Hooghe and Marks’ (2003) typology of multi-level governance to 
argue that the two countries represented contrasting systems. They pointed out that 
public bodies in Germany’s federal system are much more structured and have 
responsibility for a wide range of services (and are therefore archetypal ‘Type I’ 
jurisdictions in Hooghe and Marks’ terminology), whereas unitary England relies on a 
plethora of flexible and ‘task-specific’ organisations in a ‘Type II’ arrangement (see 
Herrschel and Newman 2002). 
 
Crucially, however, the above typologies do not highlight the contrasting reasons why 
the British and Prussian governments established local authorities in the first place, 
and how these factors have played a key role in shaping their institutional contexts 
and municipal capacity. These original drivers have meant that contemporary German 
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councils are overtly political actors, whereas their English counterparts are more 
concerned with delivering services on behalf of the central state (Blair, 1991). 
 
4.1  The development of local government in England 
 
Modern local government in England dates back to the 1835 Municipal Corporations 
Act, which allowed towns to petition Parliament for the creation of elected councils. 
As Aidt, Daunton, and Dutta (2010) have identified, this law was passed primarily to 
enable the creation of local bodies that could address the negative consequences of 
rapid urbanisation and the industrial revolution, particularly poor sanitation and anti-
social behaviour. Importantly, the Act meant that local authorities were creatures of 
statute, and therefore they could be created (or abolished) by legislation – in line with 
the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the absence of a codified constitution. 
Moreover, they were only permitted to carry out those functions that were expressly 
permitted in law – otherwise they could be prosecuted and fined for acting ultra vires 
(beyond their legal authority). These two factors illustrate how councils were 
designed to be functional agents of central government and restricted to acting on 
behalf of ministers (Jones and Stewart, 1983; Copus, 2010) – in keeping with the 
‘task-specific’ nature of Type II multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003). In 
other words, they were created for reasons of political expediency – because ministers 
felt that tasks such as overseeing sewerage systems and refuse collection were 
somewhat beneath them, and therefore established municipal authorities to undertake 
these functions on their behalf. 
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Although the Victorian era is often characterised as a ‘golden age’ for English 
municipalities (Norton, 1994) due to the wide range of activities they undertook, it is 
important to note that ministers could still determine the scope of their activities and 
continue to treat them as agents of the centre. For example, local government was not 
given any responsibility for education until after World War II, which meant that 
England relied on a patchwork system of religious schools, private institutions and 
charities right up until the 1940s. As a result, English councils were unable to use the 
education system to foster civic pride and develop local economic capacity – in 
contrast to their Prussian counterparts. 
 
Furthermore, in recent decades central government has gradually wielded more 
influence over municipalities and sought to reinforce their status as functional agents 
– rather than civic bodies that represent recognisable communities and pursue local 
interests. For example, municipal boundary changes since the 1970s have reduced the 
number of elected councils in England from 1,300 to less than 400, and resulted in the 
average English council serving a population seven times the size of its German 
counterpart. This has made it easier for ministers to exert greater control over local 
government (Dearlove, 1979), and has also resulted in council areas being determined 
on the basis of administrative efficiency rather than identifiable local communities 
(Copus, 2010). In addition, ministers removed many responsibilities from local 
government (including utilities, hospitals, further education, training and urban 
regeneration (Stoker, 2003)), and imposed a number of ‘New Public Management’ 
(NPM) reforms on them, with a view to improving the ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ 
of local services (Hood, 1991). These initiatives led to the outsourcing of functions 
such as waste collection, school meals provision and street cleaning to external ‘task-
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specific’ organisations, and meant that municipalities had much less direct 
responsibility for local public services.  
 
Indeed, ministers have argued that councils should become primarily commissioners 
rather than direct providers of services such as social care (Knapp, Hardy, and Forder, 
2001), with the result that they depend increasingly on other actors to influence 
outcomes within their localities. Between the late 1990s and 2010, central government 
also introduced a series of monitoring frameworks and performance targets that 
sought to identify whether central government priorities were being delivered at the 
local level (Eckersley, Ferry, and Zakaria, 2014), thereby illustrating how it viewed 
municipalities primarily as functional agents that were responsible for implementing 
ministerial policy. For example, the Comprehensive Area Assessment regime, which 
operated between 2008 and 2010, required local authorities to report their 
performance against a range of indicators – including three measures that related to 
climate change (Department for Communities and Local Government 2008). 
Although this can be viewed as an attempt to improve the co-ordination of climate 
policy across tiers of government, it is important to note that it only applied to 
ministerial objectives – there were very few parallel initiatives that aimed to help 
municipalities implement local priorities. 
 
Perhaps even more importantly, central government has been able to exercise 
increasing dominance over municipalities through the funding system. This has led to 
English councils having far less financial autonomy than their counterparts in other 
large Western European countries (Ferry, Eckersley, and van Dooren, 2015) – a 
situation that has been exacerbated by significant reductions in central grants since 
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2010 (Lowndes and Gardner 2016). Ironically, these funding reductions occurred at 
the same time as the 2011 Localism Act introduced a ‘general power of competence’ 
that removed the ultra vires constraint by allowing municipalities ‘to do anything that 
individuals generally may do’. Theoretically, therefore, this legislation gave councils 
the freedom to broaden their remit away from merely administering services on behalf 
of the centre (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). However, because central government 
constrains them financially, most municipalities have actually had to scale back their 
existing functions rather than carry out new activities. The net result is that that local 
politicians (rather than those in London) have had to take potentially unpopular 
decisions to cut public services (Ferry and Eckersley, 2015), illustrating how 
ministers have continued to use councils for politically expedient purposes. As the 
next subsection will show, this situation does not apply in Germany, with the result 
that municipalities are able to play a very different role in their communities. 
 
4.2  The development of local government in Prussia and Germany 
 
Since Germany did not become a unified state until 1871, and was keen to reject 
Napoleonic centralism after much of it was occupied by the French in the early 
nineteenth century, it was perhaps always more likely to favour subnational autonomy 
than England (Conradt, 2001; Norton, 1994). Indeed, its First Minister in the early 
nineteenth century, Freiherr vom Stein, played a key role in establishing a tradition of 
lokale Selbstverwaltung (local self-administration) in the country – a principle that 
remains very influential two centuries later. The idea was encapsulated in the Prussian 
Government’s Civic Ordinance of 1808, which included two important powers that 
eluded their English counterparts for well over a century. Firstly, they were granted a 
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power of general competence, which meant that councils had the freedom to 
undertake any function that they considered to be in the interests of the locality unless 
that task was specifically assigned to another government body in law (Wollmann, 
2004). Secondly, the Prussian government gave councils responsibility for public 
education, in order to achieve its twin aims of modernising the country’s economy 
and instilling ‘moral’ values such as community spirit and civic pride (Palmowski, 
2002).  
 
In contrast to England, therefore, Prussia did not establish modern municipalities to 
deal with the problems of urbanisation and industrialisation; in fact, they became 
firmly established at a time when the country’s population was still overwhelmingly 
rural (Gildea, 1987). Like their English counterparts, Prussian councils decided to 
provide a broad range of public services – but, crucially, they were able to determine 
which functions to undertake.  
 
Many of the other German states (the Länder) wanted to emulate Prussia’s economic, 
political and military success, and therefore adopted Stein’s philosophy of civic 
governance, local autonomy and Weberian bureaucracy (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 
2006). As a result, the principle of lokale Selbstverwaltung was incorporated into both 
the Second Reich and Weimar Republic constitutions and remained dominant right up 
until the 1930s. However, the Great Depression did provide a radical shock to 
punctuate this equilibrium, because it resulted in a municipal financial crisis (which 
led to Länder governments increasing their control over local government finance 
(Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006)) and ultimately paved the way for the Nazi 
dictatorship. After taking power in 1933, the Nazis subsumed local government into 
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the central state by abolishing municipal elections and political parties. They also 
replaced the constitutional principle of lokale Selbstverwaltung with that of the 
Führerprinzip – an obligation that all municipalities had to implement the will of the 
Führer (Conradt, 2001). In other words, any vestiges of local autonomy disappeared 
during the Third Reich.  
 
Notably, however, West Germany’s post-war municipal and state structures 
developed to become very similar to those of the early Weimar Republic, almost as 
though the Depression and Nazi era had never happened (Norton, 1994; Roberts, 
2000). Indeed, the Allied powers resurrected the principle of lokale Selbstverwaltung 
and enshrined it in Article 28 of the post-war Grundgesetz (Basic Law). Other 
constitutional provisions – such as an unrestricted right for municipalities to levy and 
raise the Gewerbesteuer (business tax) and Grundsteuer (property tax) in their areas, 
and the inclusion of lokale Selbstverwaltung in the individual Länder constitutions – 
also confirmed how Stein’s principles had re-emerged as the dominant institution 
(Conradt, 2001).  
 
In addition, the Grundgesetz requires the federal government to ensure that all 
German citizens enjoy ‘equivalent living conditions’ (gleichwertige 
Lebensverhältnisse). This has resulted in a complex system of financial transfers 
between Länder, and increasing collaboration across tiers of government that has 
become known as ‘Politikverflechtung’, or ‘co-operative federalism’ (Scharpf, 
Reissert, and Schnabel, 1976). This interdependence has meant that municipalities 
receive significant additional resources and support from other state actors, which 
enables them to operate as strong local actors in shaping their communities (Eckersley 
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2016). Notably, it also makes it easier for state actors to co-operate when addressing 
issues that cut across policy areas and levels of government, such as climate change. 
For example, policy-makers from across sectors and tiers have collaborated on the 
Energiewende – Germany’s ‘energy transition’ away from fossil fuels and nuclear 
power (Moss, Becker and Naumann, 2015). This contrasts sharply with the UK 
Government’s strategy of seeking to deliver its climate change policies through 
hierarchical performance frameworks, which treated municipalities as agents of the 
centre rather than democratic local bodies. 
 
Furthermore, municipalities in Germany have not introduced NPM initiatives such as 
outsourcing or privatisation to the same extent as their English counterparts, because 
the federal constitutional structure meant that such reforms were not mandated 
(Bogumil, Grohs, and Kuhlmann, 2006). Indeed, there is an increasing trend towards 
‘re-municipalisation’ (particularly of utilities) once concessionary contracts come to 
an end (Becker, Beveridge, and Naumann, 2015). As such, many German 
municipalities still operate as largely ‘multi-functional’ organisations within a largely 
Type I multi-level context, and have retained significantly more influence over local 
services when compared to their English counterparts. 
 
Finally, municipal staff and local politicians benefit from an aura of professionalism 
and competence that comes from being part of the ‘Expertokratie’ (Kost, 2010). This 
means that Germans are more likely than the English to respect council decisions and 
trust local officials to act in the interests of the area, in accordance with the principle 
of lokale Selbstverwaltung and the legacy of municipalities as representative civic 
bodies. Similarly, there is a strong belief that local government should act as the 
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‘school’ or ‘cradle’ of democracy (Blair, 1991); a high proportion of senior German 
politicians began their careers at the municipal level, and strong bonds exist between 
party members across tiers of government (Wonka and Rittberger, 2014). To illustrate 
its comparative societal importance, the percentage of Germans casting a vote in local 
elections has consistently exceeded the British figure since these data began to be 
collected systematically in 1979 (Kost, 2010; Wilson and Game, 2011). Overall, 
therefore, German municipalities are much more powerful local actors than their 
English counterparts, and German cities have been able to continue developing as 
distinct ‘local democracies’ – in spite of having to operate under financial constraints 
in recent years (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006). 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Table 1 summarises the underlying principles behind local government in Germany 
and England since the early nineteenth century. It highlights how English 
municipalities were created as politically expedient agents of the centre, and how this 
has continued since the early Victorian period. The result is that many residents see 
municipalities in overwhelmingly functional terms (rather than as democratic 
representative bodies) and have a transactional (rather than a citizen-state) 
relationship with their council. Indeed, a recent study found that elected councillors 
themselves perceive their role as being more concerned with service provision than 
‘governing’ in any overtly political sense (Copus, 2014).  
 
In contrast, German municipalities have their roots in nineteenth-century Prussian 
notions of civic pride, community representation and lokale Selbstverwaltung – ideas 
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that were temporarily displaced during the Nazi era, but returned to dominance after 
World War II. These issues have contributed to German councils having more 
capacity to implement policy objectives for two key reasons. Firstly, they are able to 
exercise more direct control over public services because fewer functions have been 
outsourced or privatised. Secondly, they have higher status in local governance 
arrangements, which allows them to exert greater influence in policy-making 
processes.  
 
5. Energy supply and domestic retrofits in Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen 
 
This section draws on primary fieldwork to illustrate how the institutional legacies 
discussed above shape contemporary policy-making in the ‘twin towns’ of Newcastle 
and Gelsenkirchen. It focuses on the methods that each municipality has adopted to 
promote the use of renewable energy and to improve the thermal efficiency of 
privately rented housing. These examples are used to highlight the link between local 
government’s establishment in both countries and municipal influence over policy-
making in the present day.  
 
5.1 Local energy provision in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
As mentioned earlier, German municipalities have retained greater control over local 
utilities compared to their English counterparts, which means that Newcastle Council 
can do much less than Gelsenkirchen to influence energy provision within the city. 
Newcastle does control some relatively small district heating networks, and has 
investigated extending them, but one interviewee pointed out that it did not have the 
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financial capacity or expertise to navigate the complex market entry process and set 
up a municipal energy supply company of its own (interview with officer at 
Newcastle City Council, 18 September, 2015). Instead, it has to try and encourage 
greater energy efficiency and use of renewables in an environment that is dominated 
by the ‘Big Six’ power companies (British Gas, Npower, SSE, Scottish Power, E.On 
and EDF), which together supply over 90 per cent of domestic gas and electricity in 
the UK (BBC, 2014). These companies are subject to various regulations that require 
them to generate a certain proportion of energy from renewable sources. However, the 
regulations are determined at the national level and therefore municipalities are not in 
a position to influence any of them – or indeed ensure that their residents buy any 
green electricity at all. In other words, Newcastle City Council is almost entirely 
dependent on the goodwill of power companies and private customers to take 
decisions that might help to reduce carbon emissions in the city. Other than favouring 
renewable sources through its own procurement policies, the council can offer very 
little in return that might encourage consumers to purchase green electricity. As one 
officer put it: 
 
‘The idea behind utility privatisation was that it would drive down costs, but actually 
it is very difficult to develop policy… because the relationship is between consumers 
and energy companies [rather than between citizens and the state]’ (interview with 
officer at Newcastle City Council, 6 January, 2012). 
 
In response to severe financial problems in the mid-1990s, Gelsenkirchen did sell off 
some shares in its Stadtwerk (municipal service provider) that was responsible for 
local utilities. However, this sale was conducted together with the neighbouring 
municipalities of Bottrop and Gladbeck, in order to ensure that the public sector 
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retained influence through a joint 49.9 per cent stake in the new energy supplier, 
Emscher Lippe Energie (ELE). Although the remaining shares in the company are 
held by the multinational RWE, the organisation is led by two executives, one of 
whom is employed by the energy giant and the other by the three authorities 
combined – and any major decisions must be approved by both of these individuals. 
This enabled the three municipalities to include a clause in the most recent energy 
contract that requires ELE to generate up to 20GwH of its annual electricity provision 
from renewable sources by 2020 (interview with officer at Gelsenkirchen Council, 16 
July, 2013). As this suggests, Gelsenkirchen has retained much more control over 
local energy provision than Newcastle – a position in line with its traditional role as a 
civic body – and thereby help to achieve the council’s policy objectives. In contrast, 
since the UK energy sector has been almost wholly privatised, the prospect of local 
(or even national) government asserting significant control over gas and electricity 
provision appears remote. 
 
5.2  Retrofitting privately-rented housing in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
As part of their climate change strategies, both Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen councils 
place a high priority on retrofitting residential properties to improve their thermal 
efficiency – thereby reducing the city’s overall carbon footprint and helping residents 
to lower their fuel bills (Newcastle City Council, 2010, Stadt Gelsenkirchen, 2011). 
There are obvious incentives for owner-occupiers to pay for measures such as roof or 
wall insulation, draught-proofing, double-glazing or more efficient boilers – because 
they will benefit from warmer homes and lower energy bills. In addition, government-
backed schemes exist in both countries to help homeowners invest in these retrofits 
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and pay back the capital cost over a long period of time (Boardman, 2012; Dowson, 
Poole, Harrison, and Susman, 2012). However, since private landlords will not live in 
the property and (in most cases) do not pay for their tenants’ energy, both Newcastle 
and Gelsenkirchen Councils have had to try and persuade these property owners to 
contribute towards achieving local policy objectives. 
 
Although Newcastle’s proportion of owner-occupiers (at 50 per cent) is lower than the 
English average, only around one-sixth of the city’s 120,000 homes are rented out 
privately – the remaining third are in the hands of social landlords or the arms-length 
management organisation that oversees housing on behalf of the council (interview 
with officer at Your Homes Newcastle, 11 June, 2012). However, a significant 
proportion of these 20,000 privately-rented homes are occupied by students on short-
term lets – typically for 12 months – and most landlords are confident of finding new 
tenants once students graduate and/or leave the city (interview with officer at 
Newcastle City Council, 6 January, 2012). As a result, neither the occupiers nor their 
landlords have much incentive to invest in retrofits, despite the fact that many 
privately-let homes date from the late nineteenth-century and have a significantly 
lower level of thermal efficiency than more recently-built properties. Moreover, 
although the local authority has tried to persuade landlords to retrofit their properties, 
they have been unable to make much progress – reflecting the council’s relatively 
weak position within the city and inability to compel actors to comply with its wishes 
(interview with officer at Newcastle City Council, 8 April, 2013).  
 
At around 16 per cent, the percentage of homes in Gelsenkirchen that are occupied by 
their owners is much lower than in Newcastle. In addition, because Gelsenkirchen’s 
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population has declined markedly in recent decades (from a peak of around 400,000 
in the early 1960s to approximately 260,000 in the present day) there is a surplus of 
housing stock in the city and therefore landlords are reluctant to increase rents in 
order to fund retrofitting projects. Furthermore, one-fifth of the city’s homes belong to 
hedge funds or public limited companies, which one officer characterised as 
‘businesses that have purely financial interests in the city’ because they are legally 
required to act in the interests of their shareholders rather than the municipality or 
their tenants (interview with officer at Gelsenkirchen Council, 27 June, 2013). As 
such, we might expect the local authority in Gelsenkirchen to find it more difficult to 
encourage property owners to invest in retrofits than its counterpart in Newcastle.  
 
As of summer 2013, however, the hedge funds and listed companies were engaging 
with the council and seeking to improve the energy efficiency of their housing stock. 
Officers at the municipality attributed this to the council’s status and its authority as 
the democratic voice of local residents, pointing out that private companies often look 
to the state for leadership and are willing to comply with its requests (interview with 
officer at Gelsenkirchen Council, 27 June, 2013). As such, Gelsenkirchen was able to 
use its status as the local authority (in the true sense of the term) to persuade them to 
invest in building retrofits. Indeed, council staff were not particularly surprised by the 
fact that these landlords agreed to participate in governance processes, even though 
the municipality was not in a position to coerce or incentivise them in any way.  
 
The fieldwork interviews revealed similar contrasts in municipal capacity in other 
policy areas, notably Gelsenkirchen Council’s policies to promote the area as a centre 
for solar energy production (see also Jung, Hardes and Schröder 2010). This began in 
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the mid-1990s, when the industry was in its infancy, and has resulted in the authority 
constructing four solar-powered housing estates and requiring all public buildings to 
install photovoltaic panels on their roofs, provided they will deliver a financial return 
within a decade (interviews with officers at Gelsenkirchen Council, 16, 19 and 22 
July 2013). Most recently, the council developed its climate change strategy with very 
little input from external actors, reflecting its position as the pre-eminent authority 
within the city that seeks to exercise hierarchical influence over other stakeholders. 
 
For its part, Newcastle City Council did not install PV panels on the roof of many 
public buildings (including its civic centre) until the end of 2015 (Metcalfe 2015). It 
has also sought to create a broad coalition of different actors to develop and 
implement its climate policies. This has resulted in close relationships with Newcastle 
University (Walsh et al., 2013), as well as non-profit groups such as the Greening 
Wingrove initiative – a volunteer-run project aimed at improving the quality of green 
spaces and local environment in the west end of the city (Davoudi and Brooks 2016). 
In contrast to Gelsenkirchen, it is notable that Newcastle’s climate change strategy 
was developed in collaboration with these other actors, reflecting the council’s weaker 
position within the locality and its legacy as a functional deliverer (or commissioner) 
of services, rather than a hierarchical civic body. 
 
6. Discussion  
 
The contrasting drivers for the creation of modern municipalities in England and 
Germany mean that Newcastle City Council is not able to exert as much authority 
over other local actors as its German counterpart in Gelsenkirchen. Stein’s philosophy 
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of civic pride and bottom-up development in nineteenth-century Prussia is still 
relevant in modern-day Germany, where the council accords greater respect in the 
locality and can therefore exert more influence over policy-making processes. In 
contrast, local authorities in England were created primarily for reasons of political 
expediency, namely to deliver services on behalf of central government that would 
ameliorate the public health crisis triggered by the industrial revolution. This legacy 
of municipalities as primarily functional organisations (rather than democratic civic 
bodies) has meant that English councils are often required to carry out the menial 
work of central government, and has resulted in them becoming weaker local actors.  
 
In short, the more rigid and multi-purpose ‘Type I’ arrangement that operates in 
Gelsenkirchen has given the German council greater capacity in local decision-
making than the flexible and task-specific ‘Type II’ structures that characterise the 
Newcastle context. Moreover, since the principle of lokale Selbstverwaltung is 
recognised at all tiers of government in Germany, Gelsenkirchen receives substantial 
support from the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia (and its regional arm, the Bezirk of 
Münster) to implement its climate change policies and the overall Energiewende 
agenda. Ironically, although UK Government ministers still view local authorities as 
delivery agencies, their relationship with councils has become increasingly detached 
from central government since the abolition of performance frameworks in 2010. In 
particular, the centre is very reluctant to provide municipalities with the resources 
they may need to achieve their policy objectives (Lowndes and Gardner 2016). 
 
As the fieldwork interviews highlighted, this means that Gelsenkirchen Council can 
exercise more control over policy-making than its counterpart in Newcastle. Since it 
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is less reliant on outside bodies (which are likely to further their own interests in 
decision-making processes), Gelsenkirchen’s approach also raises fewer concerns 
about local democratic accountability, because elected representatives exert more 
direct influence over policy. For example, interviewees in each case study city 
responded in markedly different ways to identical questions about their council’s 
willingness to pursue more radical climate change policies. As the following quote 
illustrates, an officer at Newcastle was most concerned about how large companies in 
the city might respond to particular initiatives: 
 
I think at a very basic level, we can’t tell the big partners what to do… There’s a real 
balancing challenge there around how we use our strategic powers to further the 
green agenda, whilst at the same time taking businesses with us (interview with 
officer at Newcastle City Council, 9 December, 2013). 
 
In contrast, the Gelsenkirchen interviewee stressed the potential electoral impact of 
such policies: 
 
A politician who came out strongly on climate protection here would not do well at 
the next election… The policy is always a bit more advanced than the average voter, 
but it cannot lose touch from them. I think the policy in Gelsenkirchen is where it is 
able to be (interview with officer at Gelsenkirchen Council, 22 July, 2013). 
 
The above quotes show how Newcastle Council is worried about the potential 
reactions of local businesses and other powerful actors to a change in policy, whereas 
Gelsenkirchen is more concerned about the views of its citizens. This contrast reflects 
how private companies are more prominent in Newcastle’s governance arrangements, 
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whereas they play a much more subordinate role in Gelsenkirchen. The language used 
by interviewees in the two cities is also instructive. Officers at Newcastle referred 
consistently to local ‘partners’ that help to develop and implement climate protection 
policies, but this term was noticeably absent from discussions in Gelsenkirchen, 
where interviewees would instead refer to specific organisations by name or mention 
the general economic sector within which they operated.  
 
State and non-state actors do have to collaborate in order to tackle ‘wicked issues’ 
such as climate change (Lazarus 2009; Wurzel, Zito, and Jordan, 2013), and therefore 
Newcastle’s strategy of engaging with local stakeholders to try and persuade them to 
implement policy objectives appears eminently sensible. Indeed, as Bulkeley and 
Kern (2006) highlighted in a previous comparison of policy-making in English and 
German municipalities, councils are increasingly having to engage with non-state 
actors in order to have sufficient capacity to address climate issues – rather than 
relying on more hierarchical techniques. However, public bodies may also need to 
coerce private actors to change their behaviour if they do not have a clear incentive to 
act in the general interest. Therefore, jurisdictions with strong state actors are 
probably much better placed to implement the kind of transformational (rather than 
incremental) policies that will be necessary to avoid potentially catastrophic climate 
change (Park et al., 2012).  
 
Conclusions 
 
By comparing local governance in England and Germany, this article has highlighted 
how contrasting institutional structures influence climate change policy-making 
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processes and outcomes. It has shown how these arrangements are a legacy of local 
government’s creation in Prussia and England in the early nineteenth century, and 
how they continue to shape the activities of Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle Councils in 
the present day. As a ‘task-specific’ body that was initially created to undertake 
relatively mundane functions on behalf of central government, Newcastle City 
Council has limited capacity to shape climate change policy within its area. For its 
part, however, Gelsenkirchen has retained a much more influential position within 
local governance arrangements – in line with the principle of lokale Selbstverwaltung 
and its position as the pre-eminent civic body. This comparative analysis highlights 
the importance of institutional legacies for policy-making in the present day and also 
provides a more holistic explanation for the well-documented differences in English 
and German subnational government systems. 
 
More generally, it emphasises how such institutional contrasts have significant 
implications for how decision-makers seek to tackle climate change – or indeed other 
policy problems. Weak subnational governments that exercise less influence over 
non-state actors can choose from fewer policy instruments and are much more likely 
to dilute their objectives as a result, potentially leading to sub-optimal policy 
outcomes and a loss of democratic accountability. This applies not only to other 
policy sectors but also in any country where public institutions are weak and/or 
underdeveloped. Policy-makers who seek to address complex challenges need to 
recognise how such historical and institutional constraints influence organisational 
capacity, and how this in turn shapes decision-making processes – otherwise they may 
be disappointed with the ultimate policy outcomes. Ultimately, a municipal 
government (or indeed any public body) can only act as a change agent if it is able to 
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do so – and its capacity to innovate can be shaped by external institutional factors as 
well as its own internal resources. 
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